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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION - "PERSON" IN TITLE IX
OF THE 1972 EDUCATION AMENDMENTS INCLUDES EM-
PLOYEES OF FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS - HEW
REGULATIONS TO ENFORCE TITLE IX ARE VALID. North Ha-
ven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
In 1972 Congress, under Title IX of the Education Amendments,
banned discrimination against beneficiaries on the basis of sex in feder-
ally funded educational programs.' In 1974 the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) interpreted Title IX to include faculty
and other personnel as beneficiaries of the federal funds.2 Complain-
ants, Elaine Dove and Linda Potz, were employed by the Connecticut
public school system, which is a recipient of federal funds? The wo-
men each filed separate complaints with HEW alleging that they were
victims of sex discrimination.4 Elaine Dove, a teacher, filed her com-
plaint when the North Haven Board of Education refused to rehire her
after a one year maternity leave.' Linda Potz, a counselor, filed her
complaint when the Trumbull Board of Education allegedly discrimi-
nated against her with respect to her working conditions, her assign-
ments, and her contract renewal.6 HEW investigated these complaints
and concluded that both school boards violated Title IX by discrimi-
nating against these employees.7 Subsequently, the school boards filed
separate actions in Connecticut's federal district court charging that the
HEW regulations, extending Title IX to employees of federally funded
programs, were invalid because Congress never intended to include
employees within Title IX's definition of "person."8 The district court,
in separate decislons, granted summary judgment for the plaintiff
1. The Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), provide, in part:
"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .. ." Id
2. HEW promulgated regulations to enforce Title IX under authority granted it by
Congress under the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). In
1979, HEW's functions under Title IX were transferred to the Dept. of Education
through the Dept. of Education Organization Act, 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(3) (Supp.
V 1981). The North Haven case and all prior decisions arose under HEW's appli-
cation of these regulations; therefore, both agencies are referred to in this article
as HEW. It should be noted that since the creation of the Dept. of Education,
HEW has been renamed the Dept. of Health and Human Services (HHS). 20
U.S.C. § 3508 (1976).
3. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 517-18 (1982). In the
North Haven District, approximately 47% to 67% of the federal funds received
were used for salaries. Id
4. Id
5. Id
6. Id at 518. The Board failed to renew her contract.
7. Id at 517-18.
8. These regulations originally appeared at 45 C.F.R. § 86, but were recodified at 34
C.F.R. § 106 (1982) in connection with the establishment of the Dept. of
Education.
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school boards.9 The two cases were consolidated on appeal and re-
versed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.'"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari"' and affirmed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision. 2 In so holding, the Court found that while the statu-
tory language of Title IX was inconclusive, legislative and post-
enactment history indicated Congress' intent to include employees
within the definition of person and, consequently, employees are pro-
tected under Title IX.'
3
The questions concerning the HEW regulations stem from the fact
that the 1972 Education Amendments went through Congress in the
form of a package.14 'The package included provisions to expand Title
VII to include teachers' 5 and to extend coverage of the Equal Pay Act
to include professionals in educational institutions.'6 It is clear that
employees of federally funded programs are protected under Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act; the dispute between HEW and the lower fed-
eral courts arose over whether employees were also covered under Title
IX.
1 7
Many lower courts held that HEW misinterpreted Title IX when it
read into the statute a congressional intent to protect employees.' 8
9. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1980), a/f'd
sub noma. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
10. 629 F.2d at 786.
11. 450 U.S. 909 (1980).
12. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
13. Id at 535-40. In North Haven the Supreme Court also held that the remedial
provisions of the regulations are valid. On their face, the regulations appear to
allow HEW to terminate federal funds to an entire institution because of discrimi-
nation practiced in one program.
Prior decisions that involved Title IX discrimination invalidated the regula-
tions because they were considered too broad and not in line with congessional
intent to terminate the funds of only the discriminating program. See Rice v.
President of Harvard, 663 F.2d 336 (1st Cir. 1981); Othen v. Ann Arbor School
Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F.
Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
14. For an excellent discussion of Title IX's legislative history, see Kuhn, Title IX
Employment and Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 58-59
(1976).
15. Id at 59. Title VII legislation was ultimately dropped from the Title IX package
prior to passage because a similar provision was enacted under the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 21(1), 86 Stat. 403, § 2
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1976)).
16. Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdiction, 65
GEO. L.J. 49, 59 (1976); see 20 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1976).
17. The complainants in North Haven did have remedies under Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act, which include reinstatement and back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1976) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976) (Equal Pay Act). If protected under
Title IX the complainant's remedy would be termination of funds to the discrimi-
nating institution. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Seattle Univ. v. Department of Educ., 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980),
vacated, 456 U.S. 986 (1982); Kneeland v. Bloom Tp. High School Dist. No. 206,
484 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1980); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F. Supp.
693 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 455 F. Supp.
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These courts invalidated the regulations by emphasizing different por-
tions of the legislative and post-enactment history to conclude that
Congress did not intend to afford employees the protection of Title IX.
In Islesboro School Community v. Calfano I9 the school districts chal-
lenged HEW's regulations when they were ordered to alter their policy
regarding maternity leave for employees or else face a termination of
funds.20 Although it is obvious that the language of the statute does
not explicitly include employees, HEW maintained that employees
were impliedly protected under it since it did not expressly exclude
them.2' Unconvinced, the First Circuit delved into the legislative and
post-enactment history of Title IX in an effort to ferret out who Con-
gress intended to protect. The Islesboro court, the first to invalidate the
regulations, interpreted statements made by the bill's sponsor, Senator
Birch Bayh, as an indication of Congress' intent to exclude employees
from coverage.22 The court examined Bayh's statements and con-
cluded that he differentiated between students under Title IX and em-
ployees under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 3 Consequently, the
court deemed the regulations invalid because it found that HEW ex-
ceeded its authority to promulate them when it extended Title IX's
coverage to include employees.
Several other lower courts have emphasized other parts of the leg-
islative and post-enactment history and have likewise held the regula-
tions invalid."5 These excerpts of legislative and post-enactment
history include: a congressional resolution, issued shortly after the
forty-five day period alloted for objections to HEW's regulations,
which expressly denied any inference of approval of the regulations;
2 6
Congress' explanation for the absence of a section in Title IX which
1212 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aft'd, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979); Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), affd,
593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); McCarthy v. Burkholder,
448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978); Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 438 F. Supp.
1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), afjd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972
(1979).
19. 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1977), afrd, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979).
20. 449 F. Supp. at 869.
21. 593 F.2d at 426.
22. Id at 427.
23. Id at 428. Senator Birch Bayh consistently divided his analysis of the bill into
separate categories. As the Islesboro court noted, portions dealing with students
referred to Title IX; the portions dealing with employees referred to Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act. Id
24. Id at 430.
25. See, e.g., Seattle Univ. v. Department of Educ., 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980),
vacated, 456 U.S. 986 (1982); Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); University of Toledo v. HEW, 464 F.
Supp. 693 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). See, e.g., Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 438 F.
Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aq#'d, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 972 (1979).
[Vol. 12
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corresponds with section 604 of Title VI;27 the breakdown of Senator
Bayh's summary of his bill as published in the Congressional Record;2
and, most pervasively, the presence of more remedial measures protect-
ing employees under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.29
Some courts also invalidated the regulations by disregarding
HEW's analogy to the infection theory. HEW drew this argument
from the Fifth Circuit's decision in Board of Public Instruction of Taylor
County v. Finch. 30 In Taylor County, the court interpreted Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 196431 to prevent HEW from terminating funds
to an entire school district because some programs were racially dis-
criminatory.32 Dictum in this opinion suggested that it was possible to
envision a situation where discrimination in a program which did not
receive federal money would create a discriminatory environment
which might affect the intended beneficiaries of other federally funded
programs.33 HEW extended this argument to Title IX and urged that
the discrimination of faculty in institutions covered under Title IX
would create the same infectious environment which would ultimately
affect the student. Lower courts, while slightly more receptive to this
analogy, have refused to apply it for lack of a sufficient nexus between
faculty and students? 4 Even given such a nexus, one court has con-
cluded that the possibility of such a discriminatory infection did not, by
itself, authorize HEW to regulate employment practices. 3
The lone appellate decision finding employees protected under Ti-
tle IX, previous to the current one, was Dougherty County School Sys-
tem v. Harris. 36 The plaintiff school districts allegedly violated Title IX
27. Rep. James G. O'Hara, Chairman of the 1975 House Subcommittee on post-Sec-
ondary Education and Labor, noted that the provision similar to section 604 of
Title VI was eliminated in Title IX to avoid a drafting error since Title IX's pack-
age included Title VII and Equal Pay Act legislation. Tide IX Regulation." Hear-
ing on HR Corn Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on Equal Opportunities, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. 409 (1975) (statement of James G. O'Hara, member). See, e.g.,
Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aft'd,
600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
28. 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972). See, e.g., Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 600 F.2d
581, 585 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
29. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Romeo Comm. School v.
HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Kneeland v.
Bloom Tp. High School Dist. No. 206, 484 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (N.D. m. 1980).
30. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976).
32. Taylor County, 414 F.2d at 1078.
33. Id See Kuhn, Title IX: Employment and Athletics are Outside HEW's Jurisdc-
don, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 67-69 (1976).
34. E.g., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 430 (1st Cir. 1979); Ro-
meo Comm. School v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 1977), a 'd,
600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
35. Romeo Comm. School v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1035 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aff'd,
600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
36. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated sub nonm Bell v. Dougherty County School
Sys., 456 U.S. 986 (1982).
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when they paid salary supplements to industrial arts teachers but not to
home economics teachers. None of the supplements were allocated
from federal funds. The school system challenged the HEW regula-
tions after HEW threatened to terminate all funding because of alleged
discrimination in teacher's salaries. The Fifth Circuit refused to en-
force the HEW regulations, as no federal funds were involved, but sug-
gested that if the employees had been in programs which received
federal aid, the regulations would have been enforced. 7 However, the
Dougherty County opinion glossed over the legislative history of Title
IX and relied on a single, isolated statement made by Senator Bayh3
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded, inter alia, that a female
teacher who receives less pay than a male teacher for the same work
under a federally funded program is subjected to discrimination and
can seek the protection of Title IX.3
After nearly seven years of litigation in the lower federal courts,
the Supreme Court finally accepted certiorari on two cases concerning
the validity of the HEW regulations. One lower court held that the
regulations were valid,' the other held that they were invalid.4' The
Supreme Court's affirmance of the former undoubtedly came as a sur-
prise to many commentators.42 In North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell,43 the Court went through a detailed analysis of the statute and
concluded that Congress did indeed intend for employees to be pro-
tected under Title IX. In an approach similar to that used by the lower
courts, the Supreme Court initially examined the language of the stat-
ute and noted that its exclusionary provisions' exempting certain insti-
37. 622 F.2d at 738.
38. Id Sen. Bayh's remarks appear at 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972). The Dougherty
County court neglected to note that immediately prior to the excerpt quoted the
Senator made specific references to the parallels between Titles VI and IX. Also,
the quoted excerpt apparently refers to section 1005 of the Title IX Education
Amendment; section 1005 includes the Title VII provisions which clearly deal
with employment. The court's opinion neglects to make clear the reference to
section 1005. The majority in North Haven dismissed the reference to section
1005 as an "inadvertent" error. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 525-26 n.15.
39. Dougherty County, 622 F.2d at 738.
40. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub
nomn North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
41. Seattle Univ. v. Department of Educ., 621 F.2d 992 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated, 456
U.S. 986 (1982).
42. See, e.g., Kuhn, Title IA- Employment and Athletics are Outside HEWs Jurisdic-
tion, 65 GEO. L.J. 49, 58-59 (1976); Salomone, Title IX and Employment Discrimi-
nation.- A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 9 J. LAw & ED. 433 (1980). Cf.
Friedman, Congress, The Courts, and Sex-Based Employment Discrimination in
Higher Education A Tale of Two Tiles, 34 VAND. L. REv. 37 (1981) (employers
clearly protected under Title IX).
43. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
44. Congress exempts the following programs or institutions from adherence to Title
IX: recently instituted co-educational programs; religious schools; military
schools; post-secondary, undergraduate, single-sex public institutions; fraternities,
sororities and voluntary youth service organizations; boys/girls, state/nation con-
[Vol. 12
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tutions and groups from Title IX's application could by inference be
interpreted to include employees.45 However, because the statute did
not expressly include employees, the Court turned to Title IX's legisla-
tive and post-enactment history for an expression of Congress' intent.' 6
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion concluded that statements made
by Senator Bayh during floor debates were indicative of an intent, at
least by the bill's sponsor, for Title IX to protect employees.47 The ma-
jority relied on these remarks as the only "authoritative indication of
Congressional intent regarding the scope of [Title IX]."
48
Justice Blackmun also noted that Congress failed to object to the
H EW regulations within the forty-five day period allotted for such ob-
jection.4 The majority, however, properly conceded that silence did
not imply approval since it was not long after this period that Congress
passed a resolution stating that its failure to object to the regulations
was not to be construed as approval.5" Finally, by its own admission,
the majority relied on evidence of post-enactment history, which could
not be given the weight of contemporary legislative history, concerning
Congressional failure to limit the scope of Title IX.51 In dissent, Justice
Powell, noting that it was the intent of the 1972 Congress which was at
issue, properly chastised the majority for relying solely on "truncated
legislative history" which, like the statute, was susceptible to contrary
interpretations.
52
In addition, the majority concluded that the absence of a section
analogous to section 604 of Title VI,53 which specifically excludes em-
ployees of federally funded programs from the protection of Title VI,
indicated a conscious decision to include employees under Title IX's
protection. 54 Justice Powell, in his dissent,5 5 dismissed this absence as
ferences; father-son, mother-daughter programs at public institutions; and schol-
arships received in "beauty" pageants. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2)-(9) (1976).
45. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 522.
46. id at 523-35.
47. The majority cites portions of Sen. Bayh's summary of Title IX, his prepared
statements, and floor discussions between Sen. Bayh and Sen. Pellin. Id. at 524-
26; see also 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972).
48. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 527.
49. Id at 532. This "laying before" provision, contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976),
mandates that regulations for Title IX be placed before Congress for a period of
45 days for review. The regulations are to become effective if Congress does not
disapprove of them within that time. It appears from a recent Supreme Court
opinion, however, that this legislative veto device may be unconstitutional. See
INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
50. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 534.
51. Id at 535.
52. Id at 551 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976).
54. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 528.
55. Justice Powell's dissent questions the scope of the majority's holding. He agrees
with the majority to the extent that "employees who directly participate in a fed-
eral program, L e., teachers who receive a federal grant are ... protected by Title
IX." Id at 546 n.3. (Powell, J., dissenting). This position appears to conform
19831 553
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an administrative decision to correct a newly discovered drafting error
and to avoid confusion with other provisions of the amendments which
clearly apply to employees.56 The dissent also noted specific references
made by Senator Bayh that indicated that Title IX is parallel to Title
VI in both its intent and protection.5 7
The Court's decision in North Haven, while reaching an essentially
just result, appears to fly in the face of Congressional intent to the con-
trary. The Court relies solely upon legislative history which is as sus-
ceptible to other interpretations as the language of Title IX itself.
Senator Bayh's statements had been construed by other federal courts
to find no Congressional intent to protect employees. Moreover, the
practical consequences of this decision are ignored by the majority.5
As the dissent correctly points out, the Court has found the intent to
include employees under Title IX despite the lack of any congressional
plan that establishes procedures for handling employee complaints.59
Cathleen N Cawley
with the parallels drawn to section 604 of Title VI which makes the employment
practices of recipients subject to Title VI in only limited circumstances. See supra
note 44.
56. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 547 (Powell, J., dissenting). See supra note 17.
57. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 549 (Powell, J., dissenting). "Discrimination . . . is
already prohibited by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act but unfortunately the
prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close
this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions
which generally parallel the provisions of Title VI." 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Bayh). This provision is noticeably absent from the majority's
excerpt of the Bayh statements. See id at 525.
58. The Court's interpretation of Title IX provides for a choice of remedies which,
while not at all uncommon, places the administration of the most far-reaching
remedy in the Dept. of Education, the agency least experienced in employment
matters. See Brief for Federal Respondents at 37, n.6, North Haven, 456 U.S. at
528.
59. The Dept. of Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are
charged with administering Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Congress, in passing
Title VII, also legislated the administrative procedures which were to be followed
in the event of a grievance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). No such plan was
provided for under the Title IX legislation.
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